the indefinite direct object egy kutyá-t 'a dog-ACC' requires the subjective paradigm; in (2), the definite a kutyá-t 'the dog-ACC' requires the objective paradigm. The main point of this paper is to illustrate and analyse a gap in the distribution of the objective paradigm. Personal pronoun direct objects would be expected to trigger the objective paradigm, if the relevant property is indeed related to definiteness. Note that there is no agreement in the literature as to what exact property of noun phrases triggers the objective paradigm, but it is often characterised as "roughly" involving the definiteness of the direct object (cf. den Dikken 2004 : 446, Coppock & Wechsler 2012 . It has been suggested that the trigger is the syntactic structure of the direct object (cf. Bartos 1999) , definiteness agreement (den Dikken 2004 (den Dikken , 2006 , and agreement in a formal feature, spelling out certain semantic properties of the objects (Coppock & Wechsler 2012 , Coppock 2013 .
In this paper, I will not tackle the question of what triggers the objective paradigm in general, but I will focus on its appearance given a small subset of possible direct objects, namely personal pronouns (see the above references for proposed solutions to the bigger question). The literature on the objective paradigm can arguably be split into two camps: some authors argue that only third person objects trigger the objective paradigm (cf. Coppock & Wechsler 2010 , 2012 , Coppock 2013 , den Dikken 2004 , 2006 , Rocquet 2013 ) while others are of the opinion that the objective paradigm should in principle extend to other persons as well, notably the second person. The latter position is presented most clearly in a series of papers by Katalin É. Kiss (cf. É. Kiss 2003 , 2005 as well as arguably Bartos (1999) .
The analysis presented here falls into the second group, i.e. I will argue that it is possible to analyse the Hungarian objective paradigm as expressing agreement with (again, roughly) definite direct objects in person, but not numberarguments for this view include distributional patterns in Hungarian as well as cross-linguistic analogies.
The reason for the disagreement on the nature of agreement with personal pronouns appears to lie in the distribution of verb paradigms when verbs take a personal pronoun direct object. The following examples illustrate this. In (3), the verb obligatorily appears in the objective paradigm, (3a), the subjective paradigm being ungrammatical, (3b). (4) and (5) The picture becomes less clear when the direct object personal pronoun has a different person. First, the following examples show that with first person direct objects, the subjective paradigm appears and the objective paradigm is ungrammatical. The appearance of the suffix in (8a) and its absence in (8b) and (9) is the main topic of this paper. I will argue, in line with É. Kiss (2013) , that the above data can be interpreted as showing that the appearance of object agreement depends not only on properties of the object, but also on properties of the subject, i.e. second person pronouns trigger object agreement with first person subjects but not with third person subjects.
Crucially, I analyse -lak/-lek as part of the objective paradigm. This entails that the objective paradigm is not restricted to third person direct objects. A first argument for this is distributional: we have seen above that with third person pronouns, whenever one paradigm is grammatical, the other one is ruled out. Now, given (8), repeated here, one could argue that since the subjective paradigm is ruled out, as shown by (8b), (8a) shows an instance of the objective paradigm, represented by the suffix -lak in (9a). A seeming objection to this view is presented by (9), repeated here as well. If -lak/-lek is part of the objective paradigm, i.e. agreement with second person is possible (as I argue), why do we not see it in (9)? One answer to this question has been put forth in a series of papers by Katalin É. Kiss (É. Kiss 2003 , 2005 who argues that there is an inverse agreement constraint in Hungarian, i.e. the person of the subject has to be taken into account for the distribution of the objective paradigm (see also section 2.2).
This gives us a way of analysing the puzzle posed by (8) and (9): when the subject is first person, -lak/-lek appears, but not if the subject is third person.
In the latter case, we only see the subjective paradigm. One advantage of this approach is that whenever the subjective paradigm is ungrammatical in the above examples, one can say that the verb is in the objective paradigm, and -lak/-lek is not "special" in any sense. I will propose a full analysis of this distribution in section 4.
Throughout the discussion, I will leave the case of reflexive pronouns aside -these are formally third person and behave like other third person pronouns (cf. Bartos 1999 : 104, Coppock & Wechsler 2012 . 2 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the agreement pattern in more detail and relates it to inverse agreement patterns in other languages. Section 3 relates agreement in the pronominal domain to the wider domain of object agreement in Hungarian. Section 4 fleshes out the analysis 2 Reflexives seem to consist of the root mag-'core, kernel' and a possessive suffix, though, as a reviewer points out, these suffixes are not the synchronically productive ones. Nevertheless, reflexives show third person properties: they can control third person possessive suffixes, as in (i) from Hungarian author István Örkény's story Férfiarckép, part of the collection Egyperces novellák:
'I achieved all this with my own powers.'
The reflexive magam 'myself' controls possessor agreement on erejéből 'power', whose possessive suffix is third person singular, not first person.
and discusses the relation between the present proposal and other analyses.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
Inverse agreement in Hungarian
I interpret the distribution of paradigms with personal pronoun direct objects above to be dependent on the person of both subject and direct object. The resulting pattern is not random but can be characterised using the notion of inverse agreement, i.e. the subjective paradigm arises with personal pronouns if subject and object are in an inverse configuration. In this section, I will briefly introduce the notion of inverse agreement before going on to provide an analysis the pattern illustrated above.
The notion of inverse agreement
(10) illustrates a simple person hierarchy as used in a wide range of literature (also as part of more extensive scales, cf. Silverstein 1976 , Comrie 1980 , Aissen 2003 . An inverse configuration of subject and direct object results when the value of the person of the direct object is higher on the scale than the value of the person of the subject.
(10) first person > second person > third person For example, a third person subject and a first person direct object are in an inverse configuration, because the person of the subject is lower on the scale in (10) than that of the direct object. I will refer to such configurations as inverse. Any configuration that is not inverse will be called non-inverse. To illustrate a relevant instance of an inverse configuration triggering special morphology, consider the following examples from Chukchi, discussed in Comrie (1980) and Bobaljik & Branigan (2006) . Chukchi is a Western
Siberian ergative language showing agreement with both the subject and the object in transitive clauses. There is a prefix ine-, referred to as a "detransitivizing prefix" by Comrie (1980: 64) kimitʔ-e load-INSTR '(The) young men carried away a load' (Kozinsky et al. 1988 : 652, cited in Bobaljik & Branigan 2006 both the subject and the object are on the same level of the scale; cf. section 4.3.2 for other configurations involving the same person.
In certain configurations, however, a proper subset of inverse configurations of the person of subject and object, object agreement is suspended and the verb appears in what seems to be an intransitive verb form (cf. Bobaljik & Branigan 2006: 49) . (12) (Skorik 1977 : 44, cited in Bobaljik & Branigan 2006 While the examples in (12) and (13) are still transitive, the subject bearing ergative and the object bearing absolutive case, the verb form appears as if there were no direct object present. This is indicated by the appearance of ine-as well as the two subject agreement affixes. 6
In Bobaljik & Branigan (2006) , this is explained by assuming that when two arguments enter an Agree relation with the same head in Chukchi, certain configurations of the features involved have to be removed. These are 3SG → 1SG, as well as 2 → 1, indicating the person and number of the subject and the direct object, respectively (cf. Bobaljik & Branigan 2006: 68) .
This explanation illustrates two issues which are relevant to the present discussion: the first is the nature of the generalisation over the offending configurations of subject and object. In Chukchi, only a specific subset of inverse cases is affected, with dialectal variation. Bobaljik & Branigan (2006) Béjar & Rezac's (2009) idea, to be discussed in more detail below, is that inverse configurations trigger some special process in several unrelated languages. Béjar & Rezac (2009: 55ff.) argue that the strategies with which these configurations can be repaired are also similar across languages. One of these strategies is adding a second probe to value features of the external argument in inverse configurations. This is shown in (14), where inverse configurations have an additional agreement slot.
INV-1-see 'He sees me.' (Béjar & Rezac 2009: 59) Crucially, additional agreement like wa-in (14b) only appears in inverse con-
texts. An alternative strategy, instantiated by Kashmiri, is a special case on the pronominal direct object which only appears in inverse contexts. This case is homophonous with the dative but is a distinct case (cf. Béjar & Rezac 2009: 64ff . for discussion). In light of this, the appearance of the prefix inein Chukchi, shown above, can be taken to be a repair strategy as well.
I will invoke this notion of repair strategy as used by Béjar & Rezac (2009) to account for the appearance of the subjective paradigm in inverse configurations in Hungarian below. To begin with, I will briefly discuss the analysis of inverse agreement in Hungarian as proposed by É. Kiss (2003 Kiss ( , 2005 Kiss ( , 2013 and illustrate the distribution of the Hungarian verb paradigms with respect to personal pronoun direct objects in the light of inverse and non-inverse configurations of external and internal argument.
É. Kiss on inverse agreement
É. Kiss (2003 Kiss ( , 2005 suggests the connection between agreement in Hungarian and Chukchi that I have just discussed. She illustrates the similarities between the patterns in the languages and suggests that an ancient Sprachbund might have helped spread an inverse agreement constraint from Chukchi and its relatives to Hungarian (and potentially other Uralic and Finno-Ugric languages).
In É. Kiss (2013) , she provides a motivation for this constraint, namely that in present-day Hungarian it is due to fossilised constraints based on primary and secondary topicality. She follows Dalrymple & Nikolaeva (2011) in arguing that topicality is involved in object marking in a range of languages and argues that the present-day Hungarian system is due to a constraint ruling out agreement with an object that is more topical than the subject, again following a scale like (10).
While this motivation is plausible, it seems to rely on the notion of "inherent topicality" (É. Kiss 2013: 15) of first and second person pronouns and topicality, as well a very close link between topicality, animacy and specificity: É. Kiss (2013: 16) writes that objects (secondary topics) are ruled out that are "more topical (in other words, more animate, more specific)" than the subject (the primary topic). Topicality, however, while showing a tendency to go with animate and specific (or definite) noun phrases, is an independent notion: In what follows, I develop an approach to the inverse agreement patterns that is based on truly inherent properties of personal pronouns, namely their person (and definiteness) features, making the appearance of agreement independent of information structure. Arguably, this is a simpler approach to the system in present-day Hungarian that the one proposed by É. Kiss (2013) and potentially avoids some of the criticisms just alluded to and others, like the reliance on a person hierarchy, as criticised by den Dikken (2006: 18, fn. 34), which is replaced by reference to syntactic properties of the arguments involved in Agree.
A closer look at agreement patterns
As shown above, when restricting direct objects to personal pronouns, both the subjective and the objective paradigm can appear on the verb. The choice of paradigm is not random, however: with third person personal pronoun objects, the verb is always in the objective paradigm. With first person pronoun objects, the verb is always in the subjective paradigm. It is with second person pronoun objects, that the person of the subject becomes relevant: with a first person subject, the verb shows the suffix -lak/-lek '1SG>2', whereas with a third person subject, the verb is in the subjective paradigm. Given the previous discussion, describing the distribution of the verb paradigms is straightforward: the subjective paradigm appears with personal pronoun direct objects if the two arguments are in an inverse configuration.
The data can thus be grouped as follows: in inverse contexts, i.e. 2, 3 > 1, we see the subjective paradigm, whereas in non-inverse contexts, i.e. 1, 2, 3 > 3 and 1 > 2, we see the objective paradigm (cf. also 
Interim summary
The discussion up to this point has illustrated the distribution of the two Hungarian verb paradigms with respect to personal pronoun direct objects in terms of the notion of inverse agreement. In the following section, I will propose an account as to why the distribution is the way it is, i.e. why the subjective paradigm appears in inverse configurations.
Object agreement and inverse configurations
The approach to the distribution of the Hungarian objective paradigm with respect to personal pronouns in this paper differs crucially from most previous ones in a crucial respect. As mentioned above, it is often assumed that first and second person pronouns lack a certain property which gives rise to the objective paradigm while third person pronouns have it (cf. the discussion above and Bartos 1999 , Coppock & Wechsler 2010 , Coppock 2013 . In this section, I will argue that it is not necessary to assume any differences in the personal pronouns when it comes to triggering the objective paradigm, because the distribution of the paradigms can be shown to follow from the mechanism of Agree involved in establishing the licensing of arguments and agreement in Hungarian.
Important evidence for this suggestion comes from second person pronouns.
Since, on the perspective I am taking here, these do trigger the objective paradigm when subject and object are in a direct configuration, the presence of the -lak/-lek suffix comes 'for free' as part of regular object agreement and does not have to be stipulated. In the following section, I will develop an account of how the nature of personal pronouns can derive both the presence and the lack of agreement in the patterns that I have just described.
The nature of person features
In this paper, I will assume that the person hierarchy shown in (10) can thus be illustrated as in Table 2 , cf. Béjar & Rezac (2009: 43) . 
Inverse vs. non-inverse cases
Establishing this notion of person specification makes it possible to give an account of the differences in agreement between inverse and non-inverse cases. The external argument is available to value these features in a second cycle.
Thus, the two arguments value a single probe together. This, I argue, is spelled out as the objective paradigm in (16).
In inverse cases, when the first argument -the internal argument or direct object -has a superset of features of the subject (i.e. it is higher on the hierarchy in (10)), all the features that the external argument could value have already been valued in the first cycle of Agree, see (17) for illustration. (17) 2 → 1: SUBJ? For Hungarian, the idea that a second probe is available which only agrees with the subject in inverse configurations can provide an explanation for why only the subjective paradigm appears in these contexts. Cyclic Agree thus allows us to broadly generalise over inverse and non-inverse contexts: in the latter, a single probe agrees with both the internal and the external argument -this is spelled out as the objective paradigm, showing overt reference to properties of both subject and object. In the former, inverse cases, there is no single probe which agrees with both arguments. The representation of the probes involved in spelling out the subjective paradigm in an inverse context like (18) is arguably as in (19), then:
To summarise this section, the following preliminary generalisations can account for the relation between verb paradigms and inverse/non-inverse contexts in Hungarian:
(20) Non-inverse configurations: When a verbal probe enters Agree relations with both the direct object and the subject, the verb is in the objective paradigm. 8
(21) Inverse configurations: In inverse cases, a separate probe enters an
Agree relation with the subject only, and this is spelled out as the subjective paradigm.
Briefly: these generalisations implicitly claim that object agreement does arise with first and second person pronouns across the board; it is just not spelled out in inverse cases. This is a possible reason for why the direct object personal pronouns which are highest in hierarchies like (10) give rise to unexpected 'intransitive' agreement. In addition, this suggestion does not posit (syntactic) differences between first and (some) second person pronouns, on the one hand, and third person pronouns on the other and treats the -lak/-lek suffix as a regular suffix of the objective paradigm, while taking the person of the subject into account.
Analysis: deriving the correct paradigm

The role of object agreement
As just mentioned, the system proposed above allows us to analyse all personal pronouns as having the property which triggers the objective paradigm. This is a crucial difference from analyses of the objective paradigm such as Bartos (1999), Coppock & Wechsler (2012) and Coppock (2013) . So far, however, the role of this property in the agreement system introduced above is unclear.
I will assume here that, whatever the exact property that triggers the objective paradigm is, it is part of the Agree system, thus visible for the probe that agrees with the object. In fact, I will argue that it is only this property which makes the object visible for the verbal probe, to account for the fact that not all direct objects trigger agreement (trivially: those that lack the property of triggering object agreement do not). The feature specifications shown in Table 2 above can be modified as shown in Similarly, I will assume the verbal probe in Hungarian to have an unvalued feature [uD] , giving rise to the following representations of a non-inverse configuration, (22), and an inverse configuration, (23). Adding [D] to the person specifications does not change anything about the system as introduced so far but it makes it possible to account for why objects lacking [D] do not trigger agreement: they are simply invisible to the probe and only subject agreement will be spelled out. This accounts for why indefinite noun phrases, for example, do not trigger any agreement (cf. (1)). I now turn to a problem that the current approach runs into.
A problem: 3 → 3.D agreement
The mechanism discussed so far does not yet explain why configurations with a third person subject and a third person object would trigger object agreement. A direct object like ő-t 's/he-ACC' is specified as [D] , [π] , which is in any case a superset of the specification of a third person subject which is either the same or simply [π] (given that a set is always a superset of itself). This is exactly the kind of configuration which would fully value the probe and lead to a repair strategy, as shown above. We might expect 3 → 3 configurations to trigger the subjective paradigm, but this is not what happens. In this section, I will propose that this situation does not arise because the probe is sensitive to distinctive properties on the goals in its domain. In addition, different properties of the arguments are relevant to the probe in question. 
[u ]
(27) Lát-ja see-3SG.OBJ ő-t. s/he-ACC 'S/he sees him/her.' Still, [D] is not quite like the other features in that it is only relevant on the direct object in Hungarian. This can be seen from the fact that spelling out agreement with the subject is never sensitive to the same properties which are involved in object agreement: subjects trigger agreement in any case. This is a reason for [D] being grey in Table 3 . It does not seem to be relevant for spelling out subject agreement, but only for agreement between verb and object.
Deriving the agreement patterns
If the above is correct, we are in a position to derive the relevant verb paradigms in both inverse and non-inverse patterns. In this section, I illustrate how the generalisations in (20) and (21) still characterise the underlying system of Agree.
As argued above, if the probe is satisfied by the minimal feature specification that allows it to identify an argument unambiguously, it will suffice to recog- (28) and (31) below.
With first person objects, the probe will always be fully valued after the first cycle of Agree, so subject agreement will be with a second probe. With second person objects, the probe has an unvalued [u ] feature after the first cycle, as shown in (29). Depending on the person of the subject, this unvalued feature is either valued on the same probe (with a first person subject), see (30), or the subject cannot be licensed through Agree with the first probe (with a third person subject), see (31). (29) ? → 2
(30) involves a single probe and is spelled out as the objective paradigm, whereas (31) involves an additional probe which is the only one spelled out, in the subjective paradigm. Note that the second person pronoun object behaves in exactly the same way in both cases, it is the feature specification of the subject which makes a difference for the spell-out of verb morphology.
A brief note on plurals
So far, all the examples I have discussed have included singular pronouns.
There is one configuration for which the present system predicts the wrong paradigm, namely 1.PL → 2, as shown in (32). and first person plural objects would look identical to the verb, which is insensitive to number, and first person singular would still be the most highly specified pronoun. Also note that the number of the object otherwise does not play a role for the appearance of the objective paradigm.
Potential problems?
An anonymous reviewer mentions configurations involving the same person, e.g. 1 → 1, 2 → 2 as in (33) The reviewer points out that given the generalisation in (20), we should see the objective paradigm in (33) and (34), as in other non-inverse cases.
The generalisation does in fact make that prediction, the system implemented later, however, does not. In the actual implementation of Agree, 3 → 3 is treated differently from 1 → 1 and 2 → 2, because a third person pronoun is argued to value only D but no other features. Second (and first) person objects on the other hand value the features P and S and their entailments, respectively, as shown in (35) and (36) (cf. also (29)- (31) above). Thus, the present system actually derives the patterns in (33) and (34) as it stands. Note further that potential changes to the feature specifications of 1PL as discussed in section 4.3.1 would not alter this result.
Katalin É. Kiss (p.c.) mentions a further restriction on configurations involving the same person. In (35) and (36), the subject is plural, while the object is singular. É. Kiss (2013) discusses examples in which the subject is singular, but the object is plural, and both arguments are first person, cf. (37). Given the modifications of first person plural features suggested above, this configuration is also derived by Cyclic Agree. 11 Cases involving second person on both arguments do not follow from the present system, however.
É. Kiss provides (38) , showing that singular subject and plural object lead to the objective paradigm, while plural subject and singular object give rise to the subjective paradigm.
(38) a. 
What the present analysis can and cannot do
In this section, 12 I briefly state some general properties of the analysis I have just presented and how it relates to other analyses of the same data, also discussing some potential counterexamples. Most of the points addressed here concern the nature of the suffix -lak/-lek, its structure and its relation to the objective paradigm.
Agreement in person
I have argued above, on distributional grounds, that it is possible to include the -lak/-lek suffix in the objective paradigm; this has played a crucial role in the later analysis, where the Hungarian object agreement is argued to be triggered by all second and first person pronoun objects. A reviewer argues, however, that whereas the "genuine" objective paradigm is sensitive to "some property of the object nominal other than its phi-features", -lak/-lek references person specifically. Presumably, the "genuine" objective paradigm referred to here is restricted to third person. Once we adopt the perspective that second person objects are included, the objective paradigm is always sensitive to the person of its object (though not its number). Third and second person pronoun objects are then similar in that the objective paradigm references some nonphi property as well as their person features. The non-phi property in question would be the feature [D] .
12 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers prompting me to add this section.
A note on morphology
There are certain aspects of the morphology of the objective paradigm and The present analysis has taken a different route: I take the -lak/-lek suffix to be not substantially different from suffixes agreeing with third person objects.
In the analysis introduced above, the suffixes are treated as portmanteaus with respect to the syntactic computation, the objective paradigm being spelled out exactly when two arguments value the features of one probe. An anonymous reviewer argues that it is curious to analyse the arguably most clearly segmentable verbal affix as a portmanteau and that this comes "at a cost", namely the lack of segmentability of the suffix -lak/-lek. This is a valid point, but the present system gives rise to a simpler analysis of the general agreement pattern. 14 The claim is not that dissecting -lak/-lek into smaller parts is irrelevant: the point is that for the syntax, analysing the suffix as complex might not lead to To summarise briefly, it is necessary to state that morphological segmentation of suffixes is something the present analysis cannot do, as all suffixes of the objective paradigm are treated as monomorphemic in the syntactic derivation. It seems to me that unless the syntax references the segments explicitly, the current view is plausible.
Are first and second person different from third person?
As pointed out above, from the perspective endorsed in this paper, i.e. that the objective paradigm indicates agreement in person (and definiteness), the presence of -lak/-lek on the verb follows as a case of agreement with second person. On the assumption that the objective paradigm is only sensitive to third person objects, however, this suffix has to be accounted for in a different way (or stipulated) and the lack of agreement with first person subjects is not problematic: agreement is only with third person. Bartos (1999) , for example, assumes that object agreement is a general property that is not restricted to third person. But he argues that first and second person pronouns are NumPs and thus lack the syntactic structure that triggers the objective paradigm, namely DP. Third person personal pronoun objects, however, do project a DP and do trigger the objective paradigm. On this account, the suffix -lak/-lek is somewhat mysterious, and the syntactic evidence for the difference between first and second person pronouns, on the one hand, and third person pronouns on the other, is relatively sparse (but see some very interesting arguments in den Dikken 2004). In contrast, in the semantic approach proposed by Coppock (2013) , first and second person pronouns differ from third person pronouns in not being anaphoric but purely indexical, and thus not triggering the objective paradigm (anaphoricity being the relevant trigger). This provides an account for the lack of agreement with first and second person pronouns, apart from the nature of -lak/-lek (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the need to clarify these issues).
As Coppock (2013: 369) While both of these examples have a reading in which te 'you' and téged 'you.ACC' refer to the addressee, they also give rise to readings which express that the addressee is the only person who has the property that λx[x believes that I/they will vote for x] (cf. Rullman 2004: 160) . That such readings exist shows that not all occurrences of first and second person pronouns (examples with first person are not shown but they are analogous) are indexical, but that they may be bound. On the bound readings, then, these pronouns do have antecedents of a similar kind that reflexives have, which Coppock (2013: 356) seems to analyse as requiring the objective paradigm under similar conditions. As indicated in (41a) and (41b), the choice of subject, third vs. first person, respectively, correlates with the absence and presence of -lak/-lek, as in previous examples, where the second person objects were indexical. Indexicality itself does not seem to cause differences in agreement in all cases, then. I take this to suggest as well that indexicality does not necessarily rule out (or trigger) the appearance of object agreement. Rather, the formal feature specification of personal pronouns visible to the syntax seems to influence the choice of paradigm. This is in line with the system introduced in this section; the data presented here provide additional evidence that it is plausible to assume that a shared (syntactic) property of all personal pronouns triggers the objective paradigm.
Interim summary
In this section, I proposed a mechanism based on Béjar & Rezac's (2009) Cyclic Agree which derives the distribution of the subjective and objective paradigms in Hungarian with personal pronoun direct objects. Because of the behaviour of second person pronoun direct objects which trigger different verb paradigms based on the person of the subject, I assume that all personal pronouns exhibit the same behaviour with respect to verb paradigms, namely that they all have the property which triggers object agreement, called [D] here.
The reason why the objective paradigm does not arise with personal pronoun direct objects lies in the nature of inverse configurations and repair strategies, attested in unrelated languages. The way in which agreement in inverse configurations is expressed morphosyntactically in Hungarian -intransitive verb morphology despite a highly prominent direct object -is also attested in other languages, cf. the discussion of Chukchi above.
One respect in which Hungarian differs from the languages discussed above which also show inverse agreement effects is that Hungarian only has object agreement with a proper subset of direct objects due to the presence or absence of the feature [D] . This introduces an asymmetry between subjects and objects which arguably provides an explanation for why the configuration of third person subject and third person direct object with [D] does not count as an instance of inverse agreement.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued for a novel approach to certain gaps in the distribution of the objective paradigm in Hungarian, namely with first and second person pronoun direct objects. In most of the previous literature, the failure of first and some second person pronoun direct objects to trigger object agreement has been analysed merely with respect to the direct object.
Following É. Kiss (2013) , however, I argued that it is crucial to take the person of the subject into account. Important evidence for this comes from second person pronoun objects which trigger agreement with a first person subject, but not with a third person subject. I diverge from É. Kiss's analysis by taking the formal features of the arguments but not their information structural properties to be relevant. I have attempted to model this using the system of Cyclic Agree proposed by Béjar & Rezac (2009) which provides a principled explanation for why the unexpected morphosyntactic expression of certain direct objects would appear in inverse contexts in particular. I provided some typological evidence to frame the discussion which shows that the gap in Hungarian agreement is not unusual typologically.
There are two main positive consequences of the current approach: first, it does away with syntactic differences between first and second person pronouns, on the one hand, and third person personal pronouns on the other. I think that an approach that treats personal pronouns consistently along these lines potentially gives rise to a simpler system than one deriving the presence of -lak/-lek and the lack of agreement with first person pronouns by different means. The proposed analysis derives this distribution from the feature specifications of the pronouns and the mechanism of Agree. Second, the current approach makes it possible to analyse Hungarian as showing a regular instance of differential object marking: in languages in which definiteness plays a role in DOM, personal pronouns would be expected to trigger differential marking. If the current proposal is correct, Hungarian can be said to adhere to this cross-linguistically widespread pattern in principle, with the actual expression of differential marking being overridden by the mechanics of agreement under conditions which can be precisely stated and which are familiar from other languages.
